Prince Hassan and Princess Sarvath: News and Picture Thread, Part 1

[papillon]

Originally Posted by shelley

All of these various incidents can provide more than enough material for a journalist to conclude that Q. Noor's relationship with her in laws was less that ideal.

This is fairly widely known within Jordan.

I have not yet read Q. Noor's book but so many Jordanians have told me that it is frustrating experience as there are so many inconsistencies and inaccuracies.

I have read it and found it interesting, if only because it gives some insight into her thinking. I didn't find it terribly useful as a historical document, though. It seemed clear to me she wrote it with the idea of legacy building.

And perhaps she found that she was more interested in public matters than her family. I believe she has admitted as much in her book, saying that she did not find herself a naturally maternal person, leaving much of the childrearing to nannies etc. In an interview I read many years ago she said that the king actually told her not to use any models or turn to anyone for advice, but to do things her own way. If this was the case, he did her a disservice as many of the misunderstandings etc. might have been avoided if another policy had been followed.

She criticized her own parenting skills in a Vanity Fair article that was published in 1999, after KH's death. And I think she also mentioned in the same article that KH gave her complete freedom in how she went about her role. I, too, think she needed some guidance.

[papillon]

Originally Posted by ~*~Humera~*~

the late King Hussein should've made his eldest son (ie Abdullah) Crown Prince to begin with, with the understanding that the throne would pass down to his eldest son and so forth. Thats how things are done in most monarchies around the world.

This would've prevented a lot of misunderstanding and heartache.

[Humera]

Some pictures from 1998

[Humera]

From August 1997
with several European royals

[Humera]

Bernhard wedding
June 2001

[HMQueenElizabethII]

Really wonderful.Thanks for photos.

[Veram98]

I just finished a book on the history of Jordan by Philip Robins, who is University Lecturer in Politics with special references to the Middle East in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford (with more than 20 years of working on Jordan). I highly recommend the book to people who are not only interested in speculations about the relationship between different members of Jordan's royal family but in the country itself. Because I think, that the author describes the precarious situation for PHassan during all his time as crown prince rather well, I will add here the chapter of the book on the succession question to complete Shelley's posts on this subject.

[Veram98]

(Philip Robins A History of Jordan, Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 193-97)

With 12 years between them, Hussein and Hasan had never been close. Temperamentally, they were very different: while Hussein was the four times married, dare-devil, bon viveur, Hasan was the quiet, stable, studious family man. Hussein had initially made Abdullah, his son by his second and British wife, Toni Gardiner, crown prince upon his birth in 1962, in accordance with the 1952 constitution. In view of the unstable times in the 1960s, the 'dark atmosphere', as Hussein would later refer to it, the king had changed the order of succession when Hasan reached the age of 18, Article 28 of the constitution being amended to allow the king's brother to succeed.
Like Britain's Prince Charles, for Hasan the role of crown prince was a frustrating one. On occasion, such as during the approaching civil war with the PLO, he was brought into the centre of decision-making by his eldest brother. Most of the time, however, he was kept to the margins. It did not help that Hasan was ill at ease in the crucial contexts of power in Jordan, especially in army uniform or in attending set-piece tribal occasions. Instead, Hasan played to his strengths. Domestically, he carved out a role for himself as a thinker, establishing a clutch of innovative institutions from the Royal Scientific Society to the Arab Thought Forum. He developed an interest in economy, overseeing the launch of Jordan's 1986-90 five-year plan, and patronising a range of businessmen's activities. He also emerged as a sponsor of the education sector. Internationally, Hasan became one of the youngest members of the club of the great and the good, establishing personal relations with a number of UN bodies, and being a tireless participant in inter-faith dialogue. When they worked together, such as over peace negotiations with Israel, Hasan and Hussein were the perfect foils for one another: Hasan the tireless man with an eye for detail and Hussein the gregarious big-picture man. In general, though, King Hussein was happy to see Hasan busying himself in marginal ways, as he did not want Hasan to build a solid power base for himself within Jordan.
In spite of his political marginalisation at home and growing reputation for being dour and verbose, Hasan's position as heir seemed unassailable until the consequences of Hussein`s rather messy private life began to become manifest. Having divorced his first and second wives, Hussein married a Palestinian, Alia Touqan, a match seemingly made in heaven, at a time when the king was manoeuvring vigorously in order to re-establish his authority over the West Bank. After Queen Alia's death in a helicopter crash, in 1978 Hussein married for the fourth time, to a 26-year-old Arab-American, Lisa Halaby, who took the name Noor. As part of the succession settlement at the time of his final marriage, Hussein instructed Hasan in writing that he in turn should be succeeded by Prince Ali, the single son of his union with Alia.
The revelation of the king's cancer in 1992 once again drew attention to the issue of succession. By this time, Prince Ali and his sister Princess Haya, adrift in the unforgiving atmosphere of the royal court, were regarded as going off the rails; Prince Abdullah and his younger brother Faisal were carving out promising careers in the military, the army and air force respectively; the sons of Prince Muhammad, notably Prince Talal, had come of age and was regarded seriously; Hussein now had four children by Noor, including two boys, the eldest of whom was Prince Hamzeh; while Hasan and his Pakistan born wife (Footnote by the author: Though herself a patrician, being the younger daughter of the country's first foreign minister, there is no doubt that in the hierarchical society of Jordan her origins were a disadvantage to her husband), Sarvath, also had four children, including one son, Prince Rashid. Ominously, at best King Hussein's attitude towards a Hasan succession appeared to be lukewarm.
Yet, with the looming proximity of the issue after 1992, King Hussein seemed to answer the succession question in favour of Hasan. Significantly, Hussein brought Hasan into the centre of policymaking during the negotiation of the peace treaty with Israel. In April 1995, King Hussein referred to Hasan as 'my right arm', following one of his regular cancer check-ups. In the mid-1990s, the two men seemed closer than they had ever been. It was in this context that the king pronounced anew on the issue of the succession. While Crown Prince Hasan would succeed him, the decision on the subsequent succession would be for Hasan with 'a great role' for a family council. Prince Ali was now out, and the future decidedly more open.
Yet, just as Hasan's future seemed more secure, the king's equivocation re-emerged. King Hussein froze Hasan out of his attempts to calm the south following the August 1996 riots, and refused to sack his prime minister, Abdul Karim al-Kabiriti, when his working relationship with Hasan broke down. Then came the first real sign that a Hasan succession might be in trouble, the eighteenth birthday of Prince Hamzeh in September 1997. During very public celebrations, the king sent an open letter to Hamzeh stating that he felt the prince was destined for 'great achievements', and pointing out that he himself had been 18 years of age when he had acceded to the throne. This less than subtle attempt to advance the fortunes of his favourite son seemed both to reveal Hussein's true wishes, and the growing influence behind the scenes of Queen Noor, Hamzeh's mother, especially with the recurrence of illness. Queen Noor would hardly leave the king's side during his coming hospitalisation. With long-standing tensions between Noor and Sarvath now exacerbated by the endgame of the succession, palace politics was increasingly to take on a Shakespearean atmosphere over the months ahead.
The first that Amman knew of Hussein's manoeuvre to change the succession came in January 1999, a month of high drama for the kingdom. The king returned home on the nineteenth of the month, looking awful, but supposedly in improving health. As it became clear that his rally was simply a prelude to relapse, King Hussein had to move quickly. On Monday 25 January, he declared that the succession would return to Prince Abdullah, in compliance with the original principle of primogeniture in the constitution. The one condition for such a change was that Prince Hamzeh become the new heir apparent upon Abdullah's succession; it seemed that Abdullah was the compromise candidate for the monarch who feared that rushing the succession to his favourite would be a step to far. In order to justify his actions, and to ward off factionalism, he sent a long and rambling letter to Prince Hasan explaining his actions on the same day.
With the king's sentiments now out in public, the hangers-on quickly distanced themselves from Hasan. Apart from some of his old technocratic colleagues he was left quite alone, and was certainly ill-placed to make a stand. Wisely, he chose a demeanour of quiet dignity as a mask for his deep sense of loss. With many foreign observers perennially doubting that Hasan had what it took to be a successful king, only the Israelis, with whom Hasan had struck up a close relationship since 1994, seemed to mourn his political demise. For the new-elevated Crown Prince Abdullah, the change of fortunes was breathtaking. Up to this point his best hopes had been to emulate Sharif Zaid bin Shaker, as the country's most senior soldier under a Hasan succession.

[shelley]

Thank you, Veram. That was informative and for me at least, new . I do not think it is my Prince Hassan bias that is talking when I sense an underlying appreciation of Prince Hassan's strengths and achivements. There were nay sayers in 1999, but I think now with six years having passed since the succession crisis I think it is generally accepted in Jordan and the Arab world, that Prince Hassan was far more popular than people might have realised, and has a wealth of knowledge, experience and contacts that should be used for the benefit of Jordan and the region. It is a pity that the present King does not seem to have the self confidence and wisdom to do this. Prince Hassan has in fact gone from strength to strength in the past six years, with his personal prestige enormously enhanced . I think there are many who now have cause to regret that he is not in a postion of being a real mover and shaker in Arab politics, but there are also those who feel his moral authority is all the stronger because of his independence from some of the requirements of being a Head of State in the world of today.

[Reina]

Thank you so mch veram. I will defintely get this book.

[papillon]

Originally Posted by Veram98

I just finished a book on the history of Jordan by Philip Robins, who is University Lecturer in Politics with special references to the Middle East in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford (with more than 20 years of working on Jordan). I highly recommend the book to people who are not only interested in speculations about the relationship between different members of Jordan's royal family but in the country itself. Because I think, that the author describes the precarious situation for PHassan during all his time as crown prince rather well, I will add here the chapter of the book on the succession question to complete Shelley's posts on this subject.

Thanks for the recommendation, Veram98. I just took it and ordered the book.

[papillon]

Originally Posted by Veram98

(Philip Robins A History of Jordan, Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 193-97)

Overall, this seems like a fairly balanced account to me, one that gives P. Hassan his due and also explains how KH's complicated marital and family life impacted the succession change.

In general, though, King Hussein was happy to see Hasan busying himself in marginal ways, as he did not want Hasan to build a solid power base for himself within Jordan.

Some of us have speculated on the role sibling rivalry might have played in the succession change. I believe that the differences in the brothers were apparent enough for KH to conceivably have some concerns about how his legacy would stack up against a King Hassan's, given the differences in their preparation for the role of king, their education, their intelligence, etc. The above sentence seems to support my theory.

By this time, Prince Ali and his sister Princess Haya, adrift in the unforgiving atmosphere of the royal court, were regarded as going off the rails;

These two still seem to have their issues. :(

while Hasan and his Pakistan born wife (Footnote by the author: Though herself a patrician, being the younger daughter of the country's first foreign minister, there is no doubt that in the hierarchical society of Jordan her origins were a disadvantage to her husband), Sarvath

Upon first reading this, I interpreted it as a comment on P. Sarvath's "origins" in the geographic sense. In fact, she is not Pakistan born, but Calcutta born. But as I parse the words, it seems to refer to her "origins" in the hierarchical sense, meaning (I guess) that she was not royal born. Is that how others interpret this sentence?

I'm a little confused about this, since it seems to me that some Jordanians have a bit of difficulty accepting people from outside their own country. For example, not only is P. Sarvath always referred to as Pakistani, QN is referred to as American, and these references always seem to imply some lack of acceptance, some unworthiness. I come from an immigrant nation, so I find it unfair to hold such a thing against these women.

In order to justify his actions, and to ward off factionalism, he sent a long and rambling letter to Prince Hasan explaining his actions on the same day.

The use of the word "justify" is interesting here. . .not notify, not announce, but justify. I think this is the letter in which all the nasty allegations were made about spreading rumors about QN, redecorating the palace, etc. Hmmm.

Wisely, he chose a demeanour of quiet dignity as a mask for his deep sense of loss.

I'm glad Robins noted this. It speaks volumes about P. Hassan's character.

[papillon]

Wow. . .this is a little bittersweet. . .

Full article is here

On This Day
1 April 2005

1965 – King Hussein of Jordan appoints his younger brother Prince Hassan as his heir.

[shelley]

Originally Posted by papillon

Wow. . .this is a little bittersweet. . .

Full article is here

On This Day
1 April 2005

1965 – King Hussein of Jordan appoints his younger brother Prince Hassan as his heir.

Maybe the late king had a whacky idea of what was an April Fool's joke .

[shelley]

Now this is where the guy shows his different perpective on life:


Mar. 31, 2005 River of no return?

By ORLY HALPERN





Mighty Jordan? Dams, canals and pumping stations have left the river with only 10 percent of its original flow.



Baqoora, Jordan



'And Lot lifted up his eyes, and beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere' (Genesis 13:10)



"DANGER: Forbidden to drink or bathe in water," reads the sign that hangs near the Jordan River bridge crossing. But under the bridge only weeds litter the dry riverbed, a sharp contrast to the surrounding rain-soaked green hills of early March.



The legendary Jordan River is only a trickle of its former glory. Today what keeps it flowing is the sewage dumped inside.



"The Jordan River is in danger of disappearing altogether if governments in the region do not take action immediately," said Gidon Bromberg, Israeli director of Friends of the Earth Middle East (FOEME), a joint Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian environmental organization with offices in Tel Aviv, Bethlehem and Amman.



Dams, canals and pumping stations have left the river with only 10 percent of its original flow. Decades of competition, mainly between Jordan and Israel, have sucked dry the lower Jordan River, which flows from the Sea of Galilee to the Dead Sea.



Capitalizing on the renewed Middle East peace negotiations, FOEME organized a conference earlier this month inviting Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian officials, environmentalists and farmers. But what became clear was that the decision-makers have no intention of letting the water flow back into the river.



"Unfortunately, environmental policies are governed by politics," said Jordan's Prince Hassan Bin Talal, under whose patronage the event took place. "We don't have a comprehensive peace, but I don't see why we have to continue with the policy of mutually assured destruction of the environment and resources."



FOEME realizes that to save the fabled river, all the peoples and governments who use it must cooperate. Prince Hassan goes further. He argues that environmental matters should be dealt with by a higher regional body with delegates from the different states.



But while the second intifada raged for the past four and a half years, such a meeting was impossible to arrange, which is why, shortly after the Israelis and Palestinians resumed negotiations at the Sharm e-Sheikh Summit in February, FOEME quickly set a date for the conference that they had been preparing for over a year.



About 200 participants from Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories attended the Jordan Valley Symposium, which its organizers hoped would raise awareness about the impending ecological disaster. The participants disagreed, however, about what should be done.



As the day wore on and the speakers took turns telling of their commitment to helping save the river, it became increasingly clear that the most obvious solution – letting the water flow – was not an option.



The location at Baqoora was meant to remind the participants of earlier commitments to the river. Annex Four of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty states that the two governments agree to cooperate on ecological rehabilitation of the river.



"Sadly, nothing has been done since the treaty was signed. On the contrary – the situation has worsened," said Bromberg.



"Is it a competition: who can damage the river more than the other?" asked Munqeth Mehyar, director of FoEME in Amman. "This could be understood in a state of war, but not now. Did we have to take all the water?"

[shelley]

While the environmentalist agreed with him, th